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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS
By

HAROLD
I.

G.

MAIER*

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, governmental activity to encourage and facilitate export
trade and to encourage direct investment in the United States by foreign
entrepreneurs has been the responsibility of the national government, especially the Departments of State and Commerce. During the last five
years, however, a significant and growing role is being played by the governments of the several states in developing their own programs and policies to stimulate international trade and investment. This activity includes not only the more traditional advertising of opportunities but the
active on-the-spot solicitation of business opportunities abroad. This solicitation is carried on by direct contact between state governments and both
private and governmental officials of foreign countries with the active cooperation of the United States Department of Commerce and of American
embassies and other consultants overseas. The introduction of state government into this field has resulted in a much more dynamic and effective
operation than was ever achieved by the federal government acting alone.
The recognition of coordinate interests and of the possibilities of effective
cooperation between the state and the national governments illustrates
how cooperative federalism can provide effective government participation
in an acitivity which neither the states nor the national government could
carry out as effectively acting independently. On the other hand, the introduction of state governments into an area heretofore almost exclusively
reserved to the national government is not without its potential problems.
A diversity of views and approaches, a strong competition between the
states to attract foreign investment, and the direct contact between high
state officers and foreign governmental officials and diplomats, creates the
possibility, as this activity expands, of requiring control or regulation by
the federal government in order to prevent interference with United States
foreign policy which increasingly is tied to questions of economic policy
rather than to questions turning on conflicting political ideologies.
It is the purpose of this essay to examine the constitutional relationships
between the states and the national government which may become important as state activity increases in this field. The following material is
divided into three general segments: a short survey of the activities of the
* Professor of Law and Director of Transnational Legal Studies, Vanderbilt Law School.
University of Cincinnati (J.D., 1963); University of Michigan (LL.M., 1964).
This article was prepared with the assistance of a research grant from the Vanderbilt
University Research Council. The author wishes to thank Mr. H. Van Morgan, Editor-inChief of the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw, for his excellent research assistance
to the author in preparing this essay.
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state governments in the international area and a description of the cooperative activities currently being carried on between the states and the
nation; a summary of the constitutional law which permits direct national
control over any state activity in the international commercial field; and
a more intensive discussion of the extent to which the constitutional structure limits state activities which conflict with national policy, even when
that policy has not been reduced to positive law.

II.

CooPERATvE FEDERALISM

To clarify both the tremendous benefits to be derived from cooperation
with the national government and the potential difficulties which could
result when state and federal officials begin to act at cross purposes, an
understanding of the nature and scope of both state and federal activities
in the international area is important. Traditional economic wisdom holds
that a nation must strive to maintain a favorable balance of international
trade. If exports exceed imports, the economy will prosper; if they do not,
the economy weakens. With an insufficiently favorable balance of trade
comes an unfavorable balance of payments, reduced purchasing power
abroad, and a lowered standard of living. Furthermore, increased investment of foreign capital not only strengthens the domestic industrial base,
but tends to encourage additional export of finished products while reducing the need to import. It was on the basis of this economic theory that
the United States government, during the balance of payments crisis of
the early sixties, began major efforts to stimulate export trade and to
encourage reverse investment' by foreign entrepreneurs in the United
States. President Kennedy called for intensive involvement of the national
government in this promotional activity in his "Balance of Payments and
Gold Message" of February 6, 1961.2 In that message, the President ordered the Department of Commerce to provide energetic leadership to
American industry in a drive to develop export markets by encouraging
firms and industries to increase their exporting efforts. Also, the Commerce Department was instructed to initiate new programs to bring investment opportunities in the United States to the attention of foreign investors in the industrialized countries. During the years that followed, the
Department of Commerce stepped up its program of trade missions to
foreign countries and began major efforts to emphasize abroad that the
United States was an attractive environment for investment. Until 1967,
1. Throughout this article, the term "reverse investment" is used to refer to direct investment in the production and distribution of goods or services. Neither the states nor the federal
government have directed much affirmative effort to attract portfolio investment. This is so
primarily because the internal economic benefits to be derived from portfolio investments by
foreigners are negligible. Also, foreign takeovers of existing companies sometimes create political difficulties with the public.
2. I U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIbN. NEws 1039, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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these federal programs involved primarily federal officials and representatives of the private sector. Beginning in 1967, however, the Department of
Commerce began attempts to formally involve state governments in both
export promotion and reverse investment efforts. By 1970, state governments were cooperating with the federal government through existing state
economic development agencies. In 1970, the states organized an international division of the National Association of State Development Agencies
(NASDA) and began active intergovernmental coordination of state activities in this field at the national level. Currently, a close working relationship exists between the Department of Commerce and NASDA which
results from a mutual recognition of the need for cooperation as a means
3
toward the achievement of a common goal.
Federal programs, operated through the Department of Commerce, include extensive assistance through field offices to state operations in the
international commercial development field and federally sponsored trade
missions to stimulate exports. These missions are often organized at the
state level through contacts made by state development agencies. The
Commerce Department's "Invest in USA" Program makes use of cooperative efforts between the state agencies to sponsor seminars and meetings
abroad concerning the investment climate in the United States. In addition, of course, are the continuing operations of the Export-Import Bank
and the good offices of the Department of State in providing assistance in
making necessary arrangements with foreign governments. The result of
the active entry by state governments into the field of promoting international trade and reverse investment has been to create a new force in this
area which is exerting its own influence upon federal activities in this field.
Promotion of exports attracted initial state governmental interest in the
foreign commercial field. 4 This was so partly because its benefits to local
commercial enterprise were most obvious. Exporting represented merely
the international extension of existing markets. During the 1960's, while
many state development agencies made some attempts to carry on programs designed to encourage export activity, few had special programs for
this purpose. Today, at least thirty states have special international divisions within their state development agencies and at least forty-two states
employ one or more international trade specialists. State activities to stimulate exports can be divided into two general categories: efforts to educate
local manufacturers concerning export opportunities and to alleviate fears
3. For an excellent resume of the background of state activities in this field, see J. Harwell, The States Go International, 1975 STATE GOVERNMENT 2 (Winter).
4. The following material, concerning the activities of the states, was collected from
various sources. The author received helpful information from 29 states in response to inquiries by letter and, in addition, carried out personal interviews with state development officers
and with officials in the federal departments of State and Commerce. No effort has been made
to cite to individual sources unless the nature of the source is especially pertinent to the utility
of the information which it provided.
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of entering upon an unfamiliar activity; and efforts aimed at potential
foreign purchasers to stimulate interest and provide information concerning the products available for export from manufacturers within the state.
The state agencies engage in heavy advertising in several languages and
many issue regular publications listing export opportunities. Stressing the
importance of personal contact between local businessmen and foreign
trading partners, state agencies regularly participate in overseas trade fairs
and, more recently, have sent abroad trade missions, composed of state
trade representatives and businessmen, to identify markets and confer
with foreign purchasers and government officials. In most states, representatives from the private sector, banks, chambers of commerce, trade
councils, etc., are heavily involved at the state level in this cooperative
effort to stimulate exports.
It is in stimulating reverse investment that the greatest increase in state
government activity has occurred and it is in this connection that official
and unofficial contact between state officials and officials of foreign governments is increasing. In addition to missions abroad to stimulate exports, many states send missions specifically aimed at stimulating reverse
investment by foreign firms. These missions often result in visitations to
the states by foreign government personnel and by foreign businessmen
seeking plant sites or joint venture opportunities.5
A major development during the past five years has been the tendency
of state development agencies to open their own foreign trade offices in
foreign countries. As of August, 1975, seventeen states plus Puerto Rico
were operating a total of 24 different offices in seven foreign countries. In
addition, some states operate through foreign offices previously established
to represent port authorities. Additional states have plans to open foreign
offices 7 and some wistfully view the prospect as useful but have yet to
request funding from the state legislature.8 Some states, unable to finance
5. In response to my inquiries, some state officials tended to be sensitive concerning their
activities in stimulating reverse investment. In part, this attitude may have been caused by
the inordinate publicity given to certain attempted purchases by Arab oil interests.
As one state development officer put it:
We make no effort to seek foreign capital for investments in nonmanufacturing
business enterprises, or in real estate or in tourist attractions as recently happened
when Arab oil interests endeavored to purchase the Alamo, an almost sacred historical attraction in Texas.
Letter to the author from Mr. Rawdon Barnes, Director, Public Relations, Alabama
Development Office, December 4, 1975.
6. Statistics from the National Association of State Development Agencies indicate the
following distribution of state foreign trade offices. Brussels: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia; Tokyo:
Alaska, Georgia, Michigan, New York; Frankfurt: Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Puerto Rico;
Dusseldorf: North Carolina, Ohio; Amsterdam: Minnesota; Bern: Alabama; Bonn: Maine;
Geneva: Pennsylvania; Hong Kong: Illinois; London: Texas.
7. E.g., Arkansas and Kentucky.
8. For example, The Division of Economic Development of Florida, in its formal descrip-
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foreign trade and development operations by themselves, have plans for
regional groupings which would permit coordinated activities abroad, as
well as domestically.
These state foreign trade offices are more than mere information centers;
they are charged with actively seeking out commercial possibilities in behalf of their home states. While they engage heavily in trade promotion,
their principal activity is the stimulation of reverse investment. Typically,
the offices are two- or three-person operations in buildings prominently
displaying the name of the state represented. State representatives in these
offices are not accredited diplomats since they have no formal relationships with the United States government. Much of their time is spent in
running down leads, in calling on foreign businessmen and government
officials, and in staying in contact with the local United States embassy
or consulate, particularly with the commercial attache. In addition, they
assist in the preparation of foreign trade and reverse investment missions.
There is little doubt that, as competition among the states for reverse
investment continues to grow, more and more states will be forced to open
formal offices abroad or to accept a continuing competitive disadvantage
in relation to their more aggressive sisters.
It is generally apparent that increased state activity in this field has
been of enormous mutual benefit to both the states and to the federal
agencies charged with stimulating United States international trade and
investment. Much more than the federal government, state development
agencies are able to bring home to businessmen located within the state
borders the benefits of entering an export market and are better able to
marshall local commercial expertise in efforts to attract foreign investors.
This is true because of the limited focus of the state agencies' activities,
not because of lack of expertise or initiative at the federal level. The focus
of the state development officer's effort is on benefiting the economy of the
state for which he works. His success depends, not upon the general impact
which his activities have on the economic welfare of the United States as
a whole, but upon the economic benefits which he can develop for his own
state. Thus, a major competition has developed among the states, particularly in seeking to attract foreign investment. The result has been a substantial stimulus to state activity nation-wide. That competitive stimulus
is naturally not present at the federal level. Furthermore, intimate knowltion of its activities published in July, 1975, points out that it is handicapped in soliciting
reverse investment by severely limited budgeting. The report states at p. 7:
Florida, too, has a real future in this area as its potential for winning foreign
manufacturing investment is significant and offers a chance for considerable return
in the long run. However, given insufficient funds and the fact that these activities
are not readily reconciled to the required budget format of workload standards,
effectiveness and efficiency because of the uncertainties and delays inherent in
achieving successful results, such an aggressive Bureau program has not yet been
realized.
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edge of local business conditions and, more important, personal contacts
within the banking and industrial communities provide a mechanism
through which state international trade specialists can employ maximum
leverage in their'trade promotion programs. The element of constructive
self-interest plays a major role in state activities in this field and that
element is a natural and desired result of a federal structure which presupposes the value of local self-government.
Currently, the combination of state activities in this field with those of
the federal government seems to have resulted in a healthy and productive
working relationship. There is a continuing close contact between the Department of Commerce and NASDA in Washington which stimulates exchange of advice and information. Department of Commerce field offices
appear to make a special effort to use contacts and materials provided by
state development agencies and state agencies seek assistance from Commerce personnel. Most state development officers contacted by the author
complimented the work of the field offices in their regions and expressed
concern for a possible diminution of federal funds which might inhibit their
cooperative efforts.' Some state development agencies have been officially
designated associate offices for the Department of Commerce and, in some
instances, Department of Commerce representatives are housed in state
office buildings for which the federal government pays rent. It is not unusual for state international trade specialists to have had experience in the
same field at the federal level and, consequently, to have developed personal contacts in Washington and elsewhere which are invaluable in carrying out their tasks.
It is of principal importance to understand, however, that the state
agencies acting in this field do not view themselves as merely adjuncts to
the federal effort in the trade and investment field. While they happily
take advantage of federal programs and approve of their existence, the
state agencies develop and control their own policies concerning the nature
and scope of their activities under the aegis of the state legislative and
executive branches. When a federal program is useful to the states, they
endorse it; when it is not, they tend to develop their own. One illustration
of this is the reaction in some states to the Commerce Department's
Industry-Organized Government-Approved Trade Missions (IOGA).
These missions, unlike the United States Specialized Trade Missions
which are planned, organized, and led by Department of Commerce
officers, are organized by trade associations, chambers of commerce, or
agencies of state governments. Government approved status of IOGA missions is conditioned upon the proposed mission fulfilling certain requirements. Those requirements in part stipulate: that the mission's prime
9. See also Hearings, ProposedReductions in the Export Promotion Budget and Changes
in Fees for Commerce Department Services, Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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objective be the export of United States produced goods or services; that
the mission include only one "product theme" which the Commerce Department believes offers "substantial market opportunities;" that the mission be approved by the relevant Foreign Service Posts; and that only
United States made products or those with a stated percentage of components of United States manufacture be included in the mission. In return
for meeting these and other requirements, the IOGA mission receives official designation, receives advice and assistance in planning from a formally
designated Department project officer, benefits from formal arrangements
for contacts at the relevant United States embassy or consulate abroad,
and gets a briefing in Washington prior to its departure. 0 Some states
appear to view the restrictions which they must meet in order to be granted
IOGA status as hardly worth the benefits. Consequently, they have often
set up their own trade missions without seeking formal government approval. In these instances, the Departments of Commerce and State are
informed that the mission will take place and the state agency sets up its
own contacts, either through its own foreign office or by direct contact with
the relevant United States embassies or consulates. A letter from a state
governor or his representative to a United States ambassador will not be
ignored. Furthermore, political realities make it unlikely that a state mission will be slighted by American diplomatic personnel in foreign countries, whether the mission is federally approved or not.
Several reasons prompt this independent attitude on the part of some
state development agencies. Some feel that there is no point in introducing
an additional layer of bureaucracy between their own efforts and their
foreign contacts when they can do the job just as well themselves. In some
instances, state officials seem to have taken the very realistic attitude that
trade is a "two-way street" and that, therefore, limiting trade mission
activity to promoting exports is self-defeating in the long run. The
existence of state foreign trade offices and of state personnel with backgrounds and training in the foreign trade and investment field has created
a pool of expertise and an independent capability which permits state
activity without reliance upon support services from the federal government. Furthermore, while the "Invest in USA" reverse investment missions are generally federally sponsored joint activities of several states,"
individual states have organized their own reverse investment missions not
under federal aegis. There is no evidence that the development of independent state capabilities in this field has had any adverse effects upon national policy. The fact that such a capability is developing, however, raises
some questions for the future in connection with a possible need to coordinate or control state activity at the federal level.
10.

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINIS-

TRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADE MISSIONS

11.

14-16 (1975).

For a complete description of the program, see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PAMPHLET, INVEST IN U.S.A. (1973).
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The entry of the state governments into the international trade and
investment field creates the potential for increased contact between state
officials and officials of foreign governments. In addition to state representation abroad through foreign trade offices, high state officials often legitimize state activity by personally leading trade and reverse investment
missions to foreign countries. For example, Governor David Pryor of Arkansas led a one week tour of 35 state businessmen, legislators, and others
to Europe on a reverse investment mission in October, 1975. This fall,
Governor Raymond Blanton of Tennessee traveled to the Middle East
where he conferred with six heads of state concerning trade opportunities.
He also conferred with Volkswagen officials concerning reverse investment
possibilities in Tennessee. Persons representing the private sector have
always engaged in foreign trading activities abroad. However, the opening
of official contacts between state officials and foreign government personnel creates a new forum for officials of foreign governments and opens the
possibility that the competitive atmosphere in which state trade missions
operate could be subtly used by foreign governments to further their own
ends or, at least, to obtain a sympathetic ear which may not be currently
available through the normal channels of diplomacy." Most state officials
appear to be aware of the difficulties which their activities could cause and
are quite conscious of the need to avoid creating political difficulties for
the United States. Thus, several have emphasized that state missions
avoid political discussions with foreign government personnel or businessmen and confine their meetings to matters of trade and commerce. In view
of the close relationship between economic and political considerations in
developing national foreign policy, that line may be somewhat difficult to
draw.
The proliferation of state foreign trade offices, particularly in Brussels,
could lead to the creation of a nuisance, both for American diplomatic
personnel and for foreign governments, unless there is some coordination
of their activities. According to Department of Commerce and NASDA
officials, efforts are made at the federal level, both through the American
embassy in Brussels and the Department of Commerce representatives, to
play an even-handed role in disseminating information to the various state
offices. However, there is little if any control, other than persuasion exercised at home, to limit or direct state activities on foreign soil.
Less significant, perhaps, is the fact that increased contact on the state
12. Illustrative of the awareness of foreign officials of the usefulness of establishing contacts directly with state officials is the manner in which Governor Blanton's visit to the
Middle East came about. In May, 1974, Tennessee held a conference on International Trade
and Investment in Nashville. A principal speaker at the conference was Clovis Maksoud,
Ambassador at Large representing the Arab League of Nations. Following his talk, Ambassador Maksoud extended an invitation to the then Governor Winfield Dunn to visit the Middle
East. Governor Blanton, who replaced Governor Dunn in 1975, arranged the visit based on
this invitation.
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level might contribute to an increased incidence of "ugly Americanism."
This could have some impact upon the image of the United States internationally, even though the state missions are not official representatives of
the United States government. This effect is likely to be negligible in
Europe where the populace is used to dealing with the special foibles and
attitudes of Americans. In the Middle East, the Far East, or Africa, however, the impact could be considerably more harmful. It is not clear to what
extent foreigners not used to dealing with Americans are likely to distinguish between those Americans who carry official federal diplomatic passports and those who are elected or appointed officials of state governments.
Lastly, some seeds of potential conflict may exist in contacts between
state or even federal officials primarily concerned with commercial activity, and foreign policy activities of the Department of State. It is not
unknown for a potential foreign investor to specifically ask that his initial
inquiries, at least, not be made known to the Department of State or to
his own government. Some foreign governments, despite the absence of
legal prohibitions on the export of capital, may take a dim view of efforts
to find a more favorable investment climate in the United States rather
than investing at home. Some state officials have indicated that, especially
in Europe, government policies requiring extensive fringe benefits for industrial workers have been a major stimulus to European investors to seek
a cheaper labor market in the United States. State export trade missions
may create difficulties with foreign competitiors and, consequently, with
foreign governments, especially in those countries in which the formal
separation between government and private trade policy and activity is not
emphasized to the same extent as it is in the United States.

III.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS

National Power To Regulate

It was made absolutely clear, during the formation of the federal union,
that ultimate power to regulate and control foreign commercial activity
was to reside in the national government. Much of the struggle which
accompanied the development of this country from a collection of "Free
and Independent States" under the Declaration of Independence, through
the difficulties of attempting to survive as a "confederacy" and "a firm
league of friendship" under the Articles of Confederation, to its status as
a "more perfect union" under the Constitution, involved a growing recognition of the need to centralize and strengthen national control over commercial activities, both domestic and international.' 3 No concern was as important in generating enthusiasm for an effective central government as the
difficulties which arose from the early division of authority between the
13. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§259-60 (2d ed. 1851); C. WARREN,
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 567 (1928).
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states and the national government under the Articles of Confederation
concerning the power to regulate interstate and international trade and
commerce.' As a result, many of the most important centralizing clauses
of the Constitution are those which assign authority over commercial matters to the national government.' 5
In the field of international relations, including international trade relations, the states of the Union have neither a formal international voice, nor
do they bear any international responsibility. The commerce clause, the
import-export clause," and the compact clause," together with several
other enumerated powers assigned to the national government, permit the
exercise of all necessary and proper central authority over international
trade relations.'9 That authority is supreme under article VI. Together with
the general power over foreign affairs which inherently resides in the national government,20 there is no doubt that national legislative power exists
to regulate, limit, or even forbid the activities presently being carried on
by the state governments in their efforts to stimulate international trade
and reverse investment. Thus, the national government has the power to
require the reporting by all states of their activities devoted to the stimulation of foreign trade or reverse investment. The national government could
clearly prevent the establishment of trade offices abroad by states; it could
regulate and confine their activities, or require the establishment of a
clearing house of information to make activities or information available
in one state office routinely available to others.2 '
The mere existence of federal power to control does not mean that state
activities in this field are inherently unconstitutional. The central government remains one of delegated powers. Therefore, where there is no direct
constitutional prohibition and no exercise of the delegated national powers
to regulate or disapprove, the states are free to engage in and affect commercial activities between themselves and foreign nations to the same
extent that they are free to engage in and affect commercial activities
between each other. Traditionally, states have engaged in many activities
14. See M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§1-7 (2d ed. 1969).
15. See H. Stone, Fifty Years Work of the United States Supreme Court, 14 A.B.A.J. 428,
430 (1928).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.3.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl.2.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl.3.
19. For an excellent analysis of the relationship of the "necessary and proper clause," U.S.
CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18, to the enumerated powers of Congress, see D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE ch. 2 (1974).
20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314, 57 S.Ct. 216, 218,
81 L.Ed. 255, 259-60 (1936). See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-28
(1972).
21. Some steps toward gathering such information have already been taken, although
there appears to be no present intention to create a general reporting requirement. See U.S.
DEFT. OF COMMERCE, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (1975).
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which have international effects. State laws govern foreigner and national
alike. Localized business interests which are foreign-owned are subject to
the same regulation which may be applied to economic interests centered
in sister states. State courts regularly adjudicate cases involving foreign
elements, and federal courts apply state law in diversity cases even when
one of the parties or the subject matter is foreign in origin."2 Many treaties
specifically recognize the applicability of state law to the activities of
foreign nationals.n Both political and practical realities make it highly
unlikely that the activities of state governments in this area will be prohibited, or become subject to any stringent national regulation. It would be
exceedingly difficult for any general regulatory measure to exercise meaningful control without stifling exactly the kind of dynamism and competitive drive which has made the state programs a useful and meaningful
force in stimulating export and reverse investment in support of general
federal policy in this field.
The fact that neither Congress nor the Constitution explicitly prohibits
current state activities in this field, does not mean that the states are
entirely free to pursue their present course without reference to the constitutional structure. Historically, the courts and the other branches of the
national government have derived principles of separation of state and
federal power not only from specific commands of the Constitution or from
identifiable legislative or administrative acts controlling under the supremacy clause, but from the principles which are the underpinnings of the
constitutional structure itself. If there are implicit constitutional controls,
apart from potential congressional regulation of state activities to stimulate international commerce, they must be derived from an examination
of the assumptions on which the constitutional structure is based, not
solely from an analysis of its text in an effort to identify specific prohibitions.
State activities in this field are programmatic, not regulatory, in nature.
Thus, legal questions concerning these state activities are not as clearly
defined as they have been in other instances in which state action has been
invalidated because of conflict with national law. Most judicial decisions
dealing with conflicting rights of the state and the national government to
affect foreign affairs have involved situations in which the states have
attempted to prohibit or require certain actions on the part of private
parties subject to their jurisdiction. The activities of the state development
agencies in stimulating international trade and reverse investment, while
they clearly involve commerce, just as clearly do not involve regulation,
even within the relatively broad meaning given to that characterization by
22. This principle was recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd per curiam, Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., U.S. -,
96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed. 2d 3 (1975).
23. For a more extensive analysis of the correlative roles of state and federal law in private
international cases, see E. Cheatham and H. Maier, Private InternationalLaw and Its
Sources, 22 VAD. L. REV. 27 (1968).
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the courts in construing the commerce clause.24 If prohibitions or restrictions are imposed by the Constitution upon this state activity, they will
likely be found on a case-by-case basis, not as a matter of general prohibition or restriction. Thus, the remainder of this article seeks to determine
the scope of the doctrine of federal preemption, growing out of the inherent
structure and assumptions of the constitutional allocation of powers and
the manner in which that doctrine could serve as a vehicle for effectively
limiting the implementation of state programs which might conflict with
national interests in the field of international commercial policy.
B.

Federal Common Law Preemption

Federal power to control state foreign relations activities need not find
its source in any specific textual reference or command of the Constitution.
Since the beginning of the republic, courts have emphasized the divisions
of power inherent in the governmental structure as the touchstone for
determining when state action was inappropriate. These decisions have, as
often as not, involved situations in which there was no explicit federal
positive law directly foreclosing state activity.
The most explicit statement of the preemptive effect of the general
constitutional structure in the realm of foreign affairs is found in Zschernig
v. Miller.a In Zschernig, the United States Supreme Court had to decide
the constitutionality of an Oregon statute which made the right of foreign
heirs to inherit from an Oregon intestate (under the state statute of descent
and distribution) dependent upon both the existence of a reciprocal right
of United States citizens to take property on the same terms as a citizen
or inhabitant of the foreign country, and the right of the foreign heirs to
receive in fact the proceeds of Oregon estates. The Oregon courts had found
that no reciprocal right of inheritance had been proved by the heirs and
that, in any event, the communist East German government was unlikely
to permit the proceeds of the estate to pass to them. Justice Douglas'
opinion, striking down the Oregon statute because it was "unconstitutional
as applied," was considerably muddled. Three principles can be derived
from the opinion, no one of which was specifically selected as the basis for
the result. Those three principles were: (1) that a state law was unconstitutional if it had an adverse affect upon international relations; (2) that a
state could not constitutionally interfere with the national government in
carrying out an existing foreign policy; and (3) that the statute revealed
an intent and purpose on the part of the state which was appropriate only
for the national government. The facts of the case revealed neither an
adverse effect upon international relations nor an adverse effect upon an
existing foreign policy. Furthermore, at least as evidenced by the state
court decisions cited in that case, there was no state legislative intent
24. See, e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed.
1342 (1946); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed. 2d 290 (1964).
25. 389 U.S. 429, 88 S.Ct. 664, 19 L.Ed. 2d 683 (1968).
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appropriate only for the national government."6 Thus, the true basis of the
majority decision must be found in the more general statement that there
was "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress." Much more
accurate and specific was Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in which he
forthrightly described the decision as one based upon the assumptions of
the constitutional structure, rather than upon any specific evils which the
state legislation might have accomplished. Stewart felt that the decision
of the Court in fact turned on "the basic allocation of powers between the
states and the nation 28 in matters touching foreign affairs.
The fact that the Court in Zschernig addressed the non-textual basis for
its decision directly has led some writers to conclude that the case represents a new constitutional doctrine. 2 If the doctrine was, in fact, a new one,
cases which followed Zschernig suggest that the opinion may have been
only an aberration. Most of those cases have viewed Zschernig as a more
limited decision prohibiting states from giving effect in state legislation to
their own evaluations of foreign governmental systems 2 Zschernig, however, does not represent a new doctrine. In fact, it represents only a more
explicit verbalization of an approach to constitutional interpretaion in
foreign affairs cases which has been implicit and, sometimes, explicit for
almost 200 years.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,"' Chief Justice Marshall ascribed "the genius and
character of the whole government" to the fact that national law governed
all external concerns 2 2 The theme that the constitutional structure itself,
rather than any specific text or legislation, supplies the basic rationale
supporting federal preemption has recurred regularly since. The Court
applied this principle to both interstate and foreign commerce questions
2
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens"
when it ruled that some subjects of the
commerce power were "in their nature national" and would therefore
admit only of a uniform system of regulation. 4
One of the most forthright structural analyses of the role of the states in
foreign affairs cases is found in Chy Lung v. Freeman.5 In that case, a
California statute required the posting of a special bond as a condition of
26. For an analysis of the Zschernig opinion see H. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal
Common Law in Private InternationalMatters, 5 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 136-41 (1971).
27. 389 U.S. at 432, 88 S.Ct. at 666, 19 L.Ed. 2d at 683.
28. Id. at 443, 88 S.Ct. at 672, 19 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
29. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 20 at 239.
30. See Maier, supra note 26 at 141-51.
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
32. Id. at 86, 6 L.Ed. at 43.
33. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1851).
34. Id. at 319, 13 L.Ed. at 1005. For excellent discussions of the role played by structural
analysis in commerce clause cases, See K. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal
Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 515; Note, Preemptionas a PreferentialGround: A New Canon
of Construction, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 208 (1959).
35. 92 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 550 (1875).
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debarkation of immigrants by the master of a vessel when those immigrants were determined by the state commissioner to be "lewd and debauched women." 3 Plaintiff was so characterized and was held in custody
when the master refused to post the bond for her. She had no funds with
which to post it herself. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court
issued a writ of habeas corpus, requiring plaintiff's release. The State of
California appealed. Technically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
California statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. The
decision did not, however, turn upon a conflict with any specified piece of
national legislation nor upon any specific interference with United States
policies. Rather, the Court emphasized the impropriety of state legislation
of this kind because it was contrary to the general divisions of responsibility for foreign affairs between the states and the national government. The
Court wrote:
[I]f this plaintiff . . . had been [a] subject of the Queen of Great Britain, can any one doubt that this matter would have been the subject of
international inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress? Upon whom
would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by
our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It
would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension
of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union? If we should
conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the
injury, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations
upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish
a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just reclamations which it
must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it
is held responsible? . . . The Constitution of the United States is no such
instrument. 7
In Holmes v. Jennison," Chief Justice Taney discussed extensively the
implications of the constitutional structure before holding an order by the
governor of Vermont (that a fugitive be extradited to Canada) to be a
forbidden agreement with a foreign power within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. In Missouri v. Holland,39 upholding the power of
the United States to enforce legislation to implement a treaty to protect
migratory birds, the Court interpreted the term "under the authority of the
United States" contained in the supremacy clause, 0 not by referring to
36. Id. at 276, 23 L.Ed. at 550.
37. Id. at 279-80, 23 L.Ed. at 551-52.
38. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 10 L.Ed. 579 (1840). The Court's interpretation of the "compact
clause" in this case is discussed infra, text at note 78.
39. 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920).
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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specific grants of authority to the national government by the people or the
states, but rather by reference to structural principles that underlie the
creation of a nation. Based on the principle that the power in question was
one "which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government,'"' the Court searched not for a grant of authority but, rather, for the
prohibition of an authority which must otherwise be presumed from the
national governmental structure. Finding no such prohibition, it held the
treaty and its implementing statute valid.
In two important cases involving the Litvinov Assignment," the Court
specifically declared that in matters concerning foreign affairs, national
policy was supreme, even in those instances in which that policy had not
been reduced to a treaty, statute, or constitutional text. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court stressed, in both cases, that the decision turned upon
the needs of a nation to be able to conduct foreign policy without reference
to political or legal decisions made by its constituent parts: "[Tihe policies of the States become wholly irrelevant to judicial inquiry, when the
United States, acting within its constitutional sphere seeks enforcement of
its foreign policy in the courts." 43 Nowhere does the Constitution provide
that federal policy, not reduced to a statute or international agreement
shall be supreme. The Court did not address the fact that the Litvinov
Assignment, even if treated as an international agreement binding upon
the United States, made no reference to the question whether state or
federal law should determine title to the property rights assigned. To the
extent that the assignment operated at all, it did so only to indicate that
these property rights were a matter of international concern and that,
4
therefore, conflicting state laws must yield.'
5
In Hines v. Davidowitz,' the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute
requiring the registration of aliens on the grounds that federal alien registration laws had "occupied the field." Although the Court spent much of
its opinion attempting to identify a congressional intent to preclude state
legislation, its citations to committee reports are unconvincing. As Justice
41. 252 U.S. at 433, 40 S.Ct. at 383, 64 L.Ed. at 648.
42. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937).
43. 315 U.S. at 233-34, 62 S.Ct. at 567, 86 L.Ed. at 819-20. "In our dealings with the
outside world, the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarassed by
the complications ... of political power between the national government and the individual
states." Id. at 242 (Frankfurter, J. concurring.)
44. See A. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World Community,
46 VA. L. REV. 1539, 1544-45 (1960); Professor David Engdahl reaches the same conclusion
after analysing Missouri v. Holland.
[Tihe essence of the federal power over foreign affairs is that it brings pro tanto
within the circle of federal concerns any matter which comes to be of international
concern, regardless whether or not it is a matter whose regulation would otherwise
have found support in any enumerated power.
ENGDAHL, supra note 19 at 223 [emphasis added].
45. 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941).
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Stone pointed out in dissent, nothing in any of the legislative history
indicated an intent to supercede some nineteen state registration statutes
which were already on the books and in operation when the national act
was passed in 1940.4 The majority opinion asserts an intention on the part
of Congress to provide a nationally uniform system for alien registration.
Far from any demonstrated intent of Congress, the need for national uniformity was one correctly perceived by the Court and that perception was
based on structural assumptions which supported that policy.,7
Only four years before Zschernig, the Supreme Court had relied on structural considerations to conclude that the act-of-state doctrine was a doctrine of federal common law, binding upon the states. 8 In that opinion,
Justice Harlan made it clear that decisions concerning the distribution of
competence of the various branches of the federal government to decide
whether the act of a foreign government should be given effect in United
States courts were a matter of federal law because the question of interbranch competence was constitutional in nature. 9
These cases are illustrative, not exhaustive. They demonstrate the truth
of two propositions. The first is that the courts will always seek a textual
justification, in treaty, statute, or the Constitution itself, to support a
finding of federal preemption of state activity affecting the foreign affairs
field and will often articulate their opinions in terms of that text, whether
logically justified or not. The second proposition is that the principles upon
which decisions such as these are in fact based, and which much more
effectively explain the results reached, are general structural principles
derived from the basic assumptions of the Constitution which determine
"the basic allocation of power between the states and the federal government." Thus, the constitutional principle described by the Court in
Zschernig is not, in fact, a new one. It is one which has always been a part
of the very fabric of constitutional law in the foreign affairs field and will
continue to be so barring a basic change in the structure of our federation. 0
The failure of the courts to articulate clearly the bases for these decisions
does not lie in any inherent distrust of the structural principles on which
the cases are in fact based. Rather, it lies in the tradition of the judicial
process which American courts bring to constitutional interpretation. It
was emphasized by the constitutional framers that the judiciary were to
be the servants of the Constitution and that the Constitution represented
46. Id. at 79, 61 S.Ct. at 410, 85 L.Ed. at 593.
47. The Court quoted extensively from Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 550
(1875), and devoted the entire first half of its opinion to demonstrating the importance of
national control over alien registration, without any reference at all to congressional intent.
48. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804
(1964).
49. For a more extensive comparison of Zschernig and Sabbatino, see Maier, supra note
26, at 159-62.
50. I have suggested elsewhere a three part test designed to consolidate and clarify the
functional bases of decisions such as these. See Maier, supra note 26 at 168.
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the ultimate will of the people. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The
Federalist,made this clear:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning,
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. . . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes,
stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They
ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by
those which are not fundamental."
Consequently, the judiciary feels duty bound to "apply" the constitutional
text rather than its own notions of the way in which government should
operate. More important, perhaps, is the symbolic value to the public of
judicial decisions tied to specific textual references. Although all lawyers
should realize that courts make policy determinations, including constitutional policy determinations, a blatant failure to tie such decisions to a text
may create insecurity for the public which has a strong psychological stake
in perceiving the Constitution as final and immutable except by the
amendment process. The courts, too, have a similar psychological stake in
retaining the form of textual analysis as a rationale for decision-making."
The difficulty is, of course, that neither the constitutional text nor its
legislative history provide answers to all of the situations which arise and
must be adjudicated under it. Thus, the court must play its common law
role as decider of individual cases, but its preexisting duty to follow the
consitutional command cannot be disavowed, even where no such command can actually be ascertained. The late Karl Llewellyn described the
results of this dilemma in an extremely perceptive article in the early
1930's.
The present need is thus served as if by ancient meaning; more recent
wisdom clothes itself in ancient words; the road over fiction has begun.
More, and worse: it is not conscious fiction. Clothed as it is in the language
of the original intent and language of the Document, the newer method
of dealing does not overthrow or displace the old. Rather does it creep in
silently, alongside, but leave the old still nominal master of the house. By
its own phrasing it invites confusion. By its own verbal expression it invites its own inventors, in any subsequent case, to overlook it, or to throw
it out.,
The failure to articulate explicitly the principle that constitutional
structure and form as well as text are valid bases for judicial interpretation
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 506. (Random House ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
52. See J. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STN. L. REv. 169, 236-38 (1968).
53. K. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1934).
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may obscure the development of constitutional theory, but it has not prevented it. 4 This lack of clarity causes lawyers, appearing before courts in
cases of this type, to couch their arguments in terms of specific textual
references and the lines of cases built upon them, rather than in terms of
the structural significance of state versus national action. That effect is
illustrated in a case currently pending 5 before the Tennessee Assessment
Appeals Commission of the State Board of Equilization concerning the
power of the state to tax certain enriched uranium belonging to several
Japanese utility companies. The background of this case is of considerable
relevance to the constitutional legal issues raised.
During meetings held between President Nixon and Prime Minister
Tanaka of Japan in late August, 1972, the two leaders agreed that both
countries would endeavor to move towards a better equilibrium in their
balance of payments and trade positions. 5 At the time, the United States
balance of payments vis-a-vis Japan was in serious disequilibrium. Contemporaneously with the Nixon-Tanaka communique, Robert Ingersoll,
United States Ambassador to Japan, and Kiyohiko Tsurumi, Japan's Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, released a statement in which,
among other items, it was agreed that "the Japanese power companies will
purchase $320 million in uranium enrichment services from the United
States with payment to be facilitated by the Government of Japan."57 The
general details of this agreement had already been worked out during late
August, 1972, between United States and Japanese government representatives meeting in Washington, D.C. That agreement specified that the
United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Government of Japan
"or a Japanese entity acceptable to the AEC and Japan" would enter into
a contract for the purchase by Japan of 10 million separative work units
of enrichment services "in order that Japan obtain delivery of and transfer
of title to the associated enriched uranium." Title to the uranium was to
pass to Japan upon delivery but the AEC was to retain custody of the
enriched uranium until a stated amount of feed material (unenriched ura5
nium) had been supplied by the Japanese to the AEC. 1
The projected arrangement was mutually beneficial to both countries.
Although the Japanese did not foresee extensive beginnings in the nuclear
generation of electric power until the early 1980's, it was apparent to them
54. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 1 (1969).
55. This body has been in existence for only a short period. Due to this fact and the small
caseload before it thus far, there is no formal styling of cases nor case numbers. The most
recent hearing on this case occurred on January 15, 1976.
56. See Text of a Joint Statement Following Meetings Between Prime Minister Tanaka
and President Richard Nixon at Kuilima, Oahu, Hawaii, White House Press Release (Sept.
1, 1972), reproduced in 8 COMP. PRES. Docs. 1332, (Sept. 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Statement].
57.

Announcement of Talks Between AmbassadorRobert Ingersoll and Deputy Vice Min-

ister for Foreign Affairs Kiyohiko Tsurumi, State Dept. Press Release, 5 (Sept. 1, 1972).
58. Minutes of Japan-US Discussions on Availability of Enrichment Services in Japan,
in the author's files.
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that the price of enriched uranium would continue to increase on the world
market as demand for power generation facilities increased world-wide.
The United States, on the other hand, could sell enriched uranium at a
time when the sale would have an optimum effect on the then-existing
balance of payments difficulties. It appears that the arrangement was
suggested by the United States government. 9
Pursuant to the intergovernment agreements, ten private Japanese utility companies entered into purchase and storage agreements with the
AEC. Those agreements provided that title would pass to the Japanese
utilities following payment of the contract price but that they would not
be permitted to remove the enriched uranium from the United States until
the feed material had been supplied. Both the purchase and the storage
agreements contained statements that the purchasers would "comply with
all applicable laws, regulations and ordinances of the United States and
of any State, territory, or political subdivisions."" °
The State of Tennessee and its subdivisions are prohibited from taxing
property belonging to the United States government. Consequently, all
property at the AEC's Oak Ridge facility is exempt from state or local
taxation. But when the City of Oak Ridge and Roane County discovered
that the enriched uranium sold to the Japanese private utility companies
was stored at Oak Ridge, they assessed a property tax against it and
attached the uranium to ensure payment. Payment of back taxes was also
assessed. The tax bills were mailed directly to the Japanese utilities' home
offices in Japan.
The United States Department of State faced a dilemma. The Japanese
government and the Japanese utility companies became extremely upset.
Apparently, they felt that they had agreed to purchase the enriched uranium in an effort to assist the United States and had not contemplated
that they would have to pay local taxes on it during the storage period.
Furthermore, the Japanese have stocks of enriched uranium held under
similar conditions in at least two other states. The Japanese asked the
Department of State to file a suggestion that sovereign immunity should
be granted to the property. At this writing, no such suggestion has been
made.6 0 ' The city and county officials, on the other hand, view the Japanese position as unreasonable, not only because the purchase and storage
contracts were made with private firms, not government entities, but because the uranium has greatly increased in value since the date of purchase
59. Joint Statement, supra note 56, 7, reproduced in 8 COMP. PRES. Docs. at 1333.
60. Copy of Agreement for Advance Sale of Uranium Enrichment Services between the
Government of the United States of America and The Chubu Electric Power Company, Inc.;
Copy of Storage Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
The Chubu Electric Power Company, Inc.; both in the author's files.
60.1. At a hearing on January 15, 1975, the Japanese government, through its attorney,
asked the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission to delay a decision in the case until
after the United States Department of State could hold a hearing on the immunity question
in mid-March. The Appeals Commission has taken this request under advisement.
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and the Japanese purchasers have already benefitted substantially from
that increase. The United States government saw the Japanese arrangement as a beginning to the development of an international market for
enriched uranium. The economic importance of the arrangement was,
therefore, long-term in that it would give the United States a competitive
leg up vis-a-vis other countries that are currently beginning construction
of uranium enrichment facilities. The Japanese, on the other hand, may
become dubious concerning future arrangements if they feel that the
United States has not made a complete effort to avoid the local taxation
of the uranium.
The facts of this case illustrate the applicability of a federal preemption
doctrine derived from structural analysis of the Constitution in a situation
in which no other rule appears logically to be applicable. The arrangement
between the AEC and the Japanese utilities was concluded in furtherance
of a joint intergovernmental policy designed to affect relations between the
United States and Japan. There is a continuing national interest in retaining Japanese good will, and particularly the good will of the Japanese
utilities, if the development of a future market for enriched uranium is
contemplated.
Counsel representing the Japanese utilities at the initial hearing argued
that the property was to be treated as sovereign property and was therefore
immune, that Tennessee was attempting to tax an export, and that the
Tennessee tax amounted to a burden on interstate and foreign commerce. 6'
No one of these arguments appears particularly persuasive in the light of
past State Department policy concerning sovereign immunity, or existing
judicial decisions concerning the import-export clause or the commerce
clause. A decision by the courts in favor of the Japanese utility companies
based on any of these arguments would create difficult precedents for later
cases. On the other hand, if it is held that state taxation of this uranium,
because of the special circumstances under which the agreements were
entered into, would amount to an unconstitutional interference with the
foreign policy of the United States, such a ruling would have no long term
effects. A decision on that basis would preserve the existing rules in regard
to the general rights of the state concerning exports and the commerce
clause, and would avoid future difficult situations for the State Department concerning potential sovereign immunity claims. I am not here suggesting that this would necessarily be the best result. What I am suggesting
is that any holding voiding the state tax must, of necessity, be based on
these considerations regardless of the textual or precedential grounds
which might actually be cited by the court. Ample precedent for a decision
designed to prevent adverse state impact on an ongoing foreign policy
decision by the federal government exists in the cases discussed above.
These cases make it clear that where vital external concerns may force
61.

See note 55, supra.
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a decision preempting state authority as a matter of national necessity, the
courts will find such preemption whenever state activity seriously conflicts
with the legitimate needs of the national government in the foreign affairs
field. Consequently, the fact that there is currently no existing federal
legislation dealing with state activities in stimulating international trade
and investment, nor any international agreement which is being contravened by those activities, does not mean that all such state activities are
safe from constitutional prohibition. If the state promotional activity creates effects which run counter to principles which can be derived from the
constitutional structure or counter to an expressed and operative international policy of the federal government, then those state activities are
unconstitutional.
C.

The Compact Clause

It is conceivable that a state could engage in activities to stimulate
international trade and reverse investment that so directly affected the
rights of private parties that a judicially cognizable case or controversy
could arise. 2 However, the programmatic nature of the activities of state
development agencies in this field makes this unlikely. In view of that fact,
the constitutional relationship between the state and the national government in this area is likely to be tested by political means, rather than by
judicial decision. The prohibition against state agreements or compacts
with foreign nations is the most likely ground upon which such an issue
might arise.
The meaning of the compact clause of the Constitution is far from clear.
Courts, the Congress, and legal scholars have sought vainly for the elusive
distinction between "treaties," which are absolutely prohibited to the
states, and "agreements" or "compacts" with foreign powers into which
the states may enter with the consent of Congress. 3 It is difficult to determine whether the Constitution in fact intends a distinction between treaties and other kinds of agreements with foreign nations and, if such a
distinction is intended, what its nature and legal impact might be. The
framers of the Constitution had nothing to say concerning a distinction
62. Such an issue could conceivably arise out of state government dealings with Arab
countries in the Middle East. If, for example, a state should decide to open a trade office in
one of the Arab states under an informal agreement not to staff it with Jewish persons, a case
or controversy could arise which would create a court test of the state's activities. See, e.g.,
American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 10 App.
Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1960). That case did not deal with state activity, but the
issues are closely related. See generally, Miller, supra note 44.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10 provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation. ...
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power. . ..
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between "treaties" and "agreements or compacts." 4 Nothing in the records of the constitutional convention reveals the intent of the framers on
this point, or that the topic was even discussed. 5 Only two short and
unenlightening comments pertaining to this provision appear in The
6
Federalist.
1 It ma-y have been that the absence of debate on the distinction
indicates that its meaning was so clear to the drafters of the clause that
debate was superfluous. 7
An attempt to determine the meaning of this language from contemporary usage in other fields in 1787 is not much more helpful., In a letter
written in 1775,9 Benjamin Franklin acknowledged receipt of three copies
of Emeric de Vattel's new treatise on natural law.70 Vattel was a forceful
exponent of the work of Christian L.B. de Wolff. De Wolff had defined two
categories of agreements between international states as "federa" and
"pactiones."' Vattel had preserved this distinction in his treatise.7" According to this distinction, treaties required on-going action, while compacts dealt with problems of only temporary interest. Professor Engdahl
suggests that the distinction be described as one between dispositive agreements-those which determine a one-time problem, perhaps in perpetuity-and non-dispositive agreements-those which may require on-going
negotiation or adjustment, such as Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation.7 3 It may have been that the agreements and compacts clause
was designed merely to facilitate the settlement of boundary disputes and
other minor interstate controversies, and that to read it more broadly is to
reinterpret its intent. 4 Two other writers suggest that no meaningful legal
distinction was intended by either de Wolff or Vattel. 5 If these words were
64. See D. Engdahl, Characterizationof InterstateArrangements: When is a Compact not
a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75 (1965).
65. See, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §1402 (2d ed. 1851); Weinfeld, What did the Framersof the Federal ConstitutionMean by "Agreements or Compacts?"
3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1936).
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 at 193, 195 (Beard ed. 1948) (J. Madison).
67. Engdahl, supra note 64 at 75.
68. This hypothesis has been suggested and pursued by previous commentators. Id. at 7581; Weinfeld, supra note 65.
69. 2 WHARTON, UNITED STATES REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 64 (1889).
70. E. VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE (1758). Also, at least
one early colonial commentator, George Tucker, mentioned Vattel's treatise in describing the
distinction between treaties and compacts. I TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, 309-10
(1803).
71.

C. DE WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM, METHODO, SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM, ch. iv, §369 (1749).

72. Weinfeld, supra note 65 at 460.
73. Engdahl, supra note 64 at 77.
74. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694 (1925).
75. M. McDougal and A. Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 226-32
(1945).
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terms of art used in a precise and technical sense by the framers,"6 the art,
and most certainly the precision, have been forever lost."
What remains clear is that the framers of the Constitution intended to
preclude the possibility of unlimited state freedom to hold intercourse with
foreign powers. The use of the dual characterization in the compact clause
suggests that some modes of agreement between state governments and
foreign powers are in absolute conflict with the policies underlying the
constitutional structure, and some may be appropriate as long as they are
subjected to national control or regulation. It is to custom, practice, and
structural constitutional assumptions, rather than to textual analysis, that
the modern analyst must look to determine the contemporary relevance of
this distinction. It does not appear that state governments, in carrying out
their trade promotion programs, have entered into formal agreements with
foreign governments. Even the state foreign trade offices, although established after consultation or at least notification to the foreign host government, operate under the same legal regime as would the office of an American private corporation establishing a branch office in a foreign nation.
Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, the most important question is
to what extent does general intercourse between state governments and the
governments of foreign countries require the consent of Congress as a precondition of constitutionality.
The most significant case to come before the United States Supreme
Court, challenging the right of a state to enter into an agreement or com8
pact with a foreign power, was Holmes v. Jennison."
In that case, Holmes,
who had been indicted for murder in Quebec, Canada, had fled to Vermont
where he was apprehended. Jennison, the Governor of Vermont, ordered
Holmes turned over to the Canadian authorities at the Vermont-Canadian
border. Holmes sought a writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the
Supreme Court of Vermont. An equally divided United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Arguing that Jennison's extradition order violated the
compact clause of the Constitution, Justice Taney characterized the scope
of the compact clause in very broad language. He wrote:
[The framers] anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a state and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that
evident intention, unless we give to the word "agreement" its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties."
Justice Taney went on to find that the very act of extradition implied an
"agreement" with a foreign power within the meaning of article I, §10.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Weinfeld, supra note 65 at 457.
McDougal and Lans, supra note 75 at 229-30.
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 10 L.Ed. 579 (1840).
Id. at 572, 10 L.Ed. at 595.
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Basing his analysis upon the structural principles of the Constitution, he
wrote:
Now, how is a state to hold communications with these nations? The
states neither send nor receive ambassadors to or from foreign nations.
That power has been expressly confided to the federal government. How,
then, are negotiations to be carried on with a state, when a fugitive is
demanded? Are they to treat upon this subject with the ambassador received by the United States? And is he, after being refused by the general
government, to appeal to the state to reverse that decision? . . . Every

part of [the Constitution] shows, that our whole foreign intercourse was
intended to be committed to the hands of the general government ...
It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as
regarded our foreign relations, one people, one nation; and to cut off all
communications between foreign governments, and the several state authorities."
The view that the compact clause was intended to prevent all official
contact between the state governments and foreign governments is given
substantial support by emphasis in The Federalist that, above all, the
new nation should not provide any opportunity for divisive activity on the
part of the states in foreign affairs." That this was the real policy basis
of Justice Taney's decision becomes clear when his efforts to characterize
the extradition order as some sort of mutual agreement are scrutinized.
The record gave no evidence that the Canadian government had ever
requested Jennison to deliver Holmes. To find an "agreement or compact,"
Justice Taney stretched the meaning of the terms to include unilateral
activity by a state which was accepted by the foreign power. He indicated
that if Jennison in fact delivered up Holmes, and if the Canadian authorities took custody of him at the Canadian border, then this amounted to
an agreement which was prohibited by the Constitution. More important
to the result was Justice Taney's correct analysis of the nature of the
decision to extradite.
[Tihe power in question . . .is the power of deciding the very delicate

question, whether the party demanded ought, or ought not, to be surrendered. And in determining this question, whether the determination is
made by the United States or a state, the claims of humanity, the principles of justice, the laws of nations, and the interests of the Union at large,
must all be taken into consideration, and weighed, when deliberating on
the subject. Now, it is very evident, that the councils of the general government and of the state may not always agree on this subject. The deci80. Id. at 575-76, 10 L.Ed. at 596-97.
81. See, e.g., THF FEDERALIST No. 3 at 14-15 and No. 4 at 18-19 (Random House ed. 1937)
(J. Jay); Id. No. 11 at 62 (A. Hamilton).
82. 39 U.S. at 577, 10 L.Ed. at 597.
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sion of one may stand in direct opposition to the decision of the other. How
can there be a concurrent jurisdiction in such a case?a
An apparently contrasting view in the purely interstate situation is given
in Virginia v. Tennessee." That case involved a dispute over the boundary
between the two states. The boundary line had been set by a commission
representing both states and had been approved by both state legislatures.
The Court held that the arrangement amounted to a compact or agreement
within the meaning of the constitutional requirement. It went on to indicate that Congress, by failing to take negative action and by passing legislation assuming the boundary line established by the commission, had
impliedly given its consent. The Court made it clear that it was the continued implied recognition of the boundary over a long period of years which
created the implication of assent. A single act implying such recognition
might not be sufficient. 5
Clearly, there is no support in the structure of the Constitution for the
proposition that all official contact between state governments was to be
abolished." Such a decision would have been unworkable and would, in
fact, have created a de facto centralized Government which would have
denied the basic assumption of federalism-that the various political units
were responsible for local self-government but were required to work together to make the national system effective.
In dicta, the Court suggested that the true distinction between compacts
and agreements which required congressional consent, and those which did
not, was one based on the nature and effect of the agreement. Were the
agreement "political" in nature, congressional consent was required; if
non-political, then consent was not required. Based on this distinction, the
Court found that the agreement to appoint the boundary commission did
not require the consent of Congress; but that the implementation of the
commission's findings by the states did require such consent. 7 This distinction appears to be a recognition of a political reality rather than a
"legal" one based on the intent of the framers or even upon constitutional
structure.
In arriving at the political/non-political dichotomy, Justice Field relied
upon Joseph Story's Commentaries to the Constitution 5 But Story had
83. Id. at 575, 10
84. 148 U.S. 503,
85. Id. at 522, 13
86. Id. at 517-18,
87. Id. at 519-20,
88.
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L.Ed. at 596.
13 S.Ct. 728, 37 L.Ed. 537 (1893).
S.Ct. at 735, 37 L.Ed. at 544.
13 S.Ct. at 733-34, 37 L.Ed. at 542-43.
13 S.Ct. at 734-35, 37 L.Ed. at 543.
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Perhaps the language of the former clause may be more plausibly interpreted from
the terms used, "treaty, alliance, or confederation," and upon the ground, that the
sense of each is best known by its association (noscitura sociis) to apply to treaties
of a political character ....
The latter clause, "compacts and agreements," might
then very properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed more private
rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary. . ..

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

reasoned that agreements and compacts may be entered into with the
consent of Congress precisely because they are non-political. Justice Field,
instead, found that only those agreements or compacts of a political nature
required congressional consent-but according to Story any agreement of
a political nature is absolutely prohibited and would be unconstitutional
even with consent of Congress. Furthermore, Justice Field reasoned that
non-political agreements or compacts do not require congressional consent-but Story had said that all agreements and compacts are nonpolitical (otherwise they are treaties, alliances, or confederations) and for
that reason, Congress may consent to them. By following Justice Field's
opinion, courts have removed state agreement: and compacts of a "nonpolitical" nature (all agreements and compacts according to Story) from
congressional supervision." Thus, if the distinction is taken literally, the
only agreements and compacts that must be notified to Congress and to
which Congress may consent are those absolutely prohibited to states and
to which Congress may not constitutionally agree. 0
The political/non-political dichotomy, like all legal dichotomies, describes results; it does not provide a predetermined guide to a correct
decision. In this sense, the dichotomy is no more helpful than those others
which have been regularly used to "determine" whether a given activity
is permitted or proscribed to the states when their acts touch international
affairs. In these cases, courts have spoken of domestic affairs versus foreign
affairs, private international law versus public international law, domestic
concerns versus foreign relations. In each instance, however, the courts
used these terms to describe results more accurately described on the basis
of true policy decisions, related to the federal governmental structure."
Correctly analysed, Justice Field's opinion in Virginia v. Tennessee is
really the converse of Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison. In
the latter case, Justice Taney based his holding on the proposition that
where there is a strong national interest in regulating intercourse between
state governments and foreign nations, congressional consent is required
to legitimize such state activities. Justice Field, on the other hand, made
it clear that his ruling that the initial creation of the commission did not
require congressional consent was based on the proposition that where
there is little national interest in the type of intercourse being carried out
between the states, congressional consent is not required.12 Justice Field's
discussion of the political/non-political dichotomy was designed to explain
those situations in which a sufficient national interest was present to re89. See, e.g., Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 21 S.Ct. 73, 45 L.Ed. 162 (1900);
Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 14 S.Ct. 783, 38 L.Ed. 669 (1894); McHenry County v. Brady,
37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917).
90. For vehement criticism of this anomolous position, see Engdahl, supra note 64 at 88-
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quire congressional consent as a condition of constitutionally acceptable
state intercourse. 3 The true rule of Virginia v. Tennessee seems to be,
therefore, that congressional consent is required whenever the national
government has an interest in supervising or controlling state operations
under the agreement. This test is much more meaningful than the dichotomy stated by Justice Field because it focuses upon important structural
concerns, rather than upon an attempt to solve a constitutional problem
by semantic legerdemain. More importantly, recognition that this was the
actual test applied in both Holmes and Virginia makes it possible to harmonize the two cases without seeking to adopt purely verbal distinctions.
Furthermore, it places those cases dealing with the compact clause in
direct and proper relationship with those other cases in which the Court
has had to decide between state and national power in the foreign affairs
field." Thus, the intercourse of state governments with foreign governments is more likely to require congressional consent than interstate agreements, since matters of international concern are always of principal interest to the national government under a correct structural constitutional
analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Comparatively few cases involving the compact clause have ever reached
the courts. In fact, many interstate and foreign agreements involving states
have never sought nor received the consent of Congress. 5 Many of these
arrangements, like those situations of state and foreign governmental contact in the trade and investment field, are not of the kind which are likely
to raise a case or controversy. Nevertheless, the bases for the judicial
determinations outlined above retains constitutional relevance, even in
nonjusticiable situations. When state activities raise sufficient concern
about their affect upon the national interest, then it is likely that Congress
will involve itself, perhaps both as a facilitator and as a regulator 6 In this
sense, it may be concluded that the constitutional rule involved is political,
but nonetheless constitutional. The Congress has the power to define the
national interest and to control state contacts with foreign governments
under the compact clause as soon as it perceives the need for such action.
Until that time, the validity of state action is, in effect, self-defining.
Within the principles of structural constitutional interpretation, and in the
light of the utility of cooperative federalism in this, as well as in other
fields, this is as it should be.
93. Id. at 518-19, 13 S. Ct. at 734, 37 L.Ed. at 542-43.
94. See text at notes 25 through 50.
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